Introduction
Let x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ R, and denote N = {1, . . . , n}. We claim that there exists i ∈ N such that −
To see this, assume without loss of generality that x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ · · · ≤ x n . For every k ∈ N |x 1 − x k | + |x n − x k | = |x 1 − x n | ≤ |x 1 − y k | + |x n − y k |, and by summing over all k ∈ N we get −
It immediately follows that (1) holds with respect to i = 1 or i = n, that is, with respect to one of the extreme points. 
Put another way, if n people walk on a circle from the starting points x 1 , . . . , x n to the destination points y 1 , . . . , y n respectively, is it true that they cannot jointly move closer (in terms of the sum of distances) to every starting point? In Section 2 we answer this question in the affirmative. Although our main result is formulated with respect to S 1 , it clearly also holds for any closed curve that is homeomorphic to S 1 . On the other hand it is easy to see that it does not hold for any graph embedded in the plane that contains a vertex v of degree at least 3. This is shown by taking n = 3 and letting x 1 , x 2 and x 3 be three points that lie on different edges incident with v, each being of equal distance from v, with y 1 = y 2 = y 3 = v. In Section 3 we briefly discuss a game theoretic implication of this result.
Main theorem
We first introduce some notations. Let x, y ∈ S 1 ; we denote the shorter open arc between x and y by (x, y), and the shorter closed arc between x and y by [x, y] . 2 For every x ∈ S 1 we letx be the antipodal point of x on S 1 , i.e., the diametrically opposite point. Finally, given x, y ∈ S 1 we denote the ''clockwise operator'' by ≽, and its strong version by ≻. Without being very formal, x ≽ y means that x is clockwise from y on the circle; this operator is well defined in the context of an arc of length less than π.
We are now ready to formulate and prove our main result.
Proof. Let x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ S 1 , and define a multiset X by X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. We first note that we can assume that there are no x i , x j ∈ X such that x j =x i . Indeed, in this case the claim holds trivially with respect to either i or j, since for all z ∈ S 1 ,
In particular, for every x i , x j ∈ X , (x i , x j ) and (x i ,x j ) are well-defined.
We say that two points
Let A be the set of all unordered pairs of nearly antipodal points. Given a nearly antipodal pair {x i , x j } ∈ A, let the critical arc of
See Fig. 1 for an illustration of the construction given above.
Let y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ S 1 , and define a multiset Y by Y = {y 1 , . . . , y n }. It is sufficient to prove that there exists a pair of nearly antipodal points {x i ,
Indeed, in this case we get that Eq. (2) holds with respect to either x i or x j . Therefore, assume for the purpose of contradiction that for every pair of nearly antipodal points {x i , x j } ∈ A,
We claim that Eq. (3) implies that for every pair of nearly antipodal points {x i , x j } ∈ A, the number of points from Y on crit(x i , x j ) is strictly greater than the number of points from X on the same arc. Formally, for {x i ,
We have the following claim.
Finally, it holds that for every z ∈ (
Since x i and x j are nearly antipodal, there are no points from X in (x i ,x j ) and (x j ,x i ). Therefore,
On the other hand,
Using Eqs. (4) and (5) 
In order to derive a contradiction, we also need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. There exists r ∈ N such that
Proof. It is easy to see that |A| is odd (e.g., by induction on n); let |A| = 2s + 1, for some s ∈ N. We first wish to claim that every x i ∈ X is a member of exactly s + 1 critical arcs, which directly proves Eq. (7) with r = s + 1.
Without loss of generality we prove the claim with respect to x 1 ∈ X . Consider the clockwise closed arc between x 1 and x 1 . Let Z = {z 1 , . . . , z t } be all the points x i orx i on this arc, where for all k, z k+1 ≽ z k . In particular, z 1 = x 1 and z t =x 1 . For instance, in Fig. 1 we have that Z = {x 1 , x 2 ,x 4 , x 3 ,x 1 }. Now, we have that the set of nearly antipodal pairs A is exactly the set of pairs {x i , x j } such that z k is a point x i and z k+1 is an antipodal pointx j (this is a type 1 nearly antipodal pair), or z k is an antipodal pointx i and z k+1 is a point x j (this is a type 2 nearly antipodal pair). If {x i , x j } is a nearly antipodal pair of type 1, we have that x 1 ∈ [x i , x j ], and hence x 1 ∈ crit(x i , x j ).
On the other hand, if {x i , x j } is a nearly antipodal pair of type 2, then x 1 ̸ ∈ crit(x i , x j ). Since z 1 = x 1 is a point from X and x n+1 =x 1 is an antipodal point, the number of nearly antipodal pairs of type 1 is exactly s + 1, which proves the claim. In order to prove Eq. (8), let y ∈ S 1 . It is sufficient to prove that there exists x i ∈ X such that y appears in at most as many critical arcs as x i , since we already know that x i is a member of exactly s + 1 critical arcs. We consider the two points or antipodal points that are adjacent to y, and briefly examine four cases.
1. x i ≼ y ≼ x j : y appears in exactly the critical arcs that contain x i (these are also exactly the critical arcs that contain x j ). 2. x i ≼ y ≺x j : y appears in exactly the critical arcs that contain x i .
3.x i ≺ y ≼ x j : y appears in exactly the critical arcs that contain x j . 4.x i ≼ y ≼x j : When walking counterclockwise fromx i , let x k ∈ X be the first point from X , and letx l be the last antipodal point such that x k ≺x l ≼x i . Then y is contained in exactly the critical arcs that contain x k , except for crit(x k , x l ), that is, in exactly s critical arcs.
We deduce that every y i is contained in at most r = s + 1 critical arcs, which implies the validity of Eq. (8).
It follows from Lemma 2 that
in contradiction to Eq. (6).
A game theoretic interpretation
Consider a facility location setting where the facility is to be located on a network. Each player i ∈ N has an ideal location for the facility on the network; the player's cost is the distance between its ideal location and the location that was selected for the facility. A mechanism is a function that receives the reported ideal locations of the players as input, and returns the location of the facility. From the game theoretic point of view it is desirable that mechanisms be immune to manipulation by rational players. A mechanism is strategyproof if players can never benefit by misreporting their ideal location, regardless of the reports of the other players. In other words, by misreporting his location a player cannot influence the facility location in a way that it becomes closer to his ideal location. Schummer and Vohra [2] establish a characterization of deterministic strategyproof facility location mechanisms on networks. In particular, they show that if the network is a circle then the only deterministic strategyproof and onto mechanism is a dictatorship of one of the players, i.e., given any constellation of ideal locations the mechanism selects the ideal location of a fixed player.
Randomization provides a way around this negative result. Indeed, under the random dictator mechanism the ideal location of one of the agents is selected uniformly at random. This mechanism is strategyproof: if an agent was chosen as the dictator then it could not have gained from lying, whereas if it was not chosen then it could not have affected the outcome. Random dictator is also ''fair'' compared to a deterministic dictatorship, and in particular produces an outcome that yields a good approximation to the optimal facility location in terms of minimizing the sum of players' costs.
3
Taking our game theoretic requirements a step further, we say that a mechanism is group strategyproof if even a coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying, that is, for every joint deviation by a coalition there is a member of the coalition whose expected distance from the facility does not decrease. Group strategyproofness is a highly desirable property, but is rarely satisfied by nontrivial mechanisms. We can derive the following result as an immediate corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Assume that the network is a circle. Then the random dictator mechanism is group strategyproof.
To see this, note that we can assume without loss of generality that the deviating coalition contains all the players. Indeed, the expected cost of a player given that a nondeviating player is selected by the mechanism, and the probability that a nondeviating player is selected by the mechanism, are both independent of the reports of the deviating players. The corollary follows after scaling by a factor of 1/n. For more details, including the formal facility location model, the reader is referred to [1] .
